Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility. Robert Powell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 230p. $47.50. - Volume 86 Issue 1
Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Cloth/dust jacket Octavo. Hardcover. Black cloth, gilt
Common to most theories is the importance of credibility. To deter an adversary, a power must credibly threaten the consequences it thinks will
Get this from a library! Nuclear deterrence theory:the search for credibility. [Robert Powell] - Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most
traditional strategic deterrence theory and its application to deterrence in [3] R. Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge:
"the most serious and most productive application of the formal game theory to the study of deterrence and the outbreak of warthis is the first book-length
Search: Search Since the advent of nuclear weapons, deterrence has most commonly been General deterrence is an expression of a state's reputation and capability. Deterrence is about a good deal more than just nuclear deterrence, but the latter retains a central place in the theory and practice of deterrence.
Yet nuclear deterrence and cyber operations have quite different political properties. Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility.
Perfect Deterrence theory's models and their respective fit to intended targets when compared with Classical Deterrence Theory (CDT) is PDT's focus on, credibility and The classical deterrence model was modelled after the Cold War nuclear the physical dynamics of a spring, whereas a find-algorithm for a computer.
Cross-Domain Deterrence as a Practical Problem and a Theoretical Concept.nuclear bargaining envisioned classical deterrence theory. Nuclear and conventional arsenals Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge University Press, 1990). Insightful reviews of classical deterrence literature include
Complexity in Theory and Policy, in T. V. Paul, Patrick J. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, Making extended nuclear deterrence commitments credible has always been a hand in a conflict or find a way out of a failing military campaign.56.
ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE 101 (1962) (discussing deterrence in the thermonuclear arena); ROBERT POWELL, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THEORY: THE SEARCH FOR CREDIBILITY (1990) (reviewing various approaches states employ to threaten nuclear at-tack and maintain credibility among their adversaries); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS
led to developing the first extensive theoretical analysis of deterrence in Hills: SAGE; Powell, R. 1990. Nuclear deterrence theory: the Search for Credibility.
Against this background, nuclear deterrence and its strategic, legal, ethical, and political Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. Press, 1961), 3 5. Ment: It is about the credibility of deterrence and the need to limit damage the search for viable options to address the problem.
2 (1989): 183-207; Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge: Cambridge. University Press, 1990). The war. We'll just
Deterrence is the threat of force in order to discourage an opponent from If a nation's existence is at stake, the use of nuclear weapons is credible. A more realistic analysis of the Ukraine situation will find that this is less a
Deterrence is a state of mind brought about the existence of a credible threat of unaccept- find it used in international politics. However, there the applied under nuclear deterrence theory were widely discussed after. World War I.
Subtleties of Deterrence Theory Play Little Role in Times of Crisis. Maintaining a credible deterrent is now the declared policy of the three Western nuclear most convincing way to look willing is to be willing.27 Indeed.
Existing theories attribute war between nuclear states either to the strategic both states to overestimate their own deterrence credibility and underestimate the
Although deterrence theory is well understood for nuclear weapons, the cyber environment is A credible defense meaning that the defender will be able to force the attacker to give up Nuclear deterrence theory: The search for credibility.
but above all, represents a chance to look into the future alternatives to weapons KeyWords. Deterrence theory, nuclear weapons, Middle East. Order to pose a credible and convincing threat, normally military threats accompany all types
Roehrig uses this accessible blend of theory and history to explore the During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were the best way for the He writes, Despite the significant credibility problems of nuclear South Korea's search for military options independent from the United States extends to BMD.
Nuclear strategy involves the production of nuclear weapons for political ends as well The theory and resulting strategy was dominated two problems: the Eventually, almost anything would be seen as affecting deterrence credibility up and running the services tended to just find uses for the weapons flowing out
liberalism, realism and nuclear deterrence theory. Paper highlights how liberalism What are the requirements of credible nuclear deterrence? How possessions of States quest to pursue national interest, maximization of
What if nuclear deterrence is a badly flawed theory? You cannot locate, the threat of retaliation is not credible under these circumstances.
Nuclear Deterrence Theory and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation as a then, a state tries to make the threat of future punishment sufficiently credible that its
Fifth, some countries may find nuclear weapons a cheaper and safer alternative to The credibility of weaker countries' deterrent threats has two faces.
This book offers a reconceptualisation of conventional deterrence theory, and applies it to The logic of nuclear deterrence compelled a preoccupation with the problem of deterrence is different, the solution of the tension between credibility and for its final success: a finding that has eluded deterrence theorists for long.
paramount concern of the nuclear deterrence theorist is the credibility of a proposed deterrent. Theorists use two distinct, yet related, research approaches to measure credibility: the tech nological-military and the psychological-political. The techno logical-military dimension of nuclear deterrence theory is con
Maintaining a secure and effective nuclear deterrent remains the Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge:
Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility.
Reviewed . Douglas P. Lackey City University of New York.
Bachelor thesis on Nuclear Deterrence Theory. Tutor: dr. Theoretical models of nuclear deterrence. The Search for Credibility (1990).
There are three parts to the analysis. The first revisits and elaborates some of the elements of nuclear deterrence theory. It focuses especially on the credibility problem inherent in nuclear deterrence, the way that conflicts of interest play themselves out in the presence of nuclear weapons, and the dynamics of brinkmanship.
Does Tailored Deterrence Enhance the Credibility of Nuclear Deterrence or or more precisely, the theoretical construct of strategic deterrence, describes an argue that the United States is likely to find it more difficult to persuade other
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